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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 21/01/2008 Accident number: 490 
Accident time: 10:45 Accident Date: 19/04/2007 
Where it occurred: Goor Dara Road, 
Khuajaohar District, 
Takhar province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 29/05/2007 
ID original source: OPS/03101-37 Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: YM-1 AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
soft 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 21/01/2008 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: WGS 84 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E 69.39645 Map north: N 36.8991 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate survey (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
mechanical detonation (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. 
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 Cover letter 
File: OPS/03101-37 
Date: 29 May, 2007 
To: See Distribution List 
From: Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul 
Subject: Investigation Reports & Lessons Learned from the Demining Accident Happened on 
[International demining NGO] Loader at Goor-Dara village,  Khwaia-Ghar district of Takhar 
province on 19 April 2007  
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned from Demining Accident 
that has happened on [International demining NGO] Loader (MDU # 09) at Goor-Dara village, 
Khwaja Ghar district of Takhar province on 19 April 2007. 
Best regards, Distribution List 
Complete Investigation Report to [International demining NGO] 
Lessons Learned to: [Other demining organizations in-country] 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
DEMINING ACCIDENT HAPPENED AT [International demining NGO] LOADER AT GOOR-
DARA ROAD, HAMWARSAI DISTRICT OF KHWAJA-GHAR DISTRICT  ON 19th APRIL 
2007 
INTRODUCTION 
On 19 April 2007, a YM-1 antipersonnel mine has exploded on loader of [International 
demining NGO] (MDU # 9) while the machine was operating on MF # 
AF1212/12579/H1475/HQ1585/SHA — 4. 
SUMMARY 
A. On 19 April 2007, while the [International demining NGO] loader (MDU # 9) was excavating 
the ground by using Gill bucket and then the soil inspecting for Antitank mines and UXO but 
an antipersonnel YM-1 mine has passed through the grids of the Gill bucket and missed from 
inspection. While the Loader has been levelling the loose dragged soil, in reverse position the 
front left was tyre driven on the mine and exploded it. 
The accident did not have any casualty but small damage on the rubber of the tyre. 
CONCLUSIONS 
B. The investigation concluded that the accident has happened because of the following 
reasons: 
a) Lack of precise information about the minefield; however the request from local people 
indicates the presence of Antipersonnel mines on both sides of the road but the technical 
survey has only confirmed that area as Antitank contaminated. The Gill system has been 
used as the team supposed the area as Antitank contaminated area as he has not more 
investigate about the area from local people. 
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b) Team Leader failed to properly read the local request and ask and investigate them more 
about the existence of antipersonnel mine in this area. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
C. The following are recommended by the Investigation Team: 
a) The [International demining NGO] general survey teams are recommended to make sure 
the collected report is as much precise as possible. 
b) The Star Basket system is recommended to be used for the rest of the task. 
c) Before commencement of clearance operations, the team leader of clearance team is 
required to do a reconnaissance of the whole task and obtain update information from locals. 
d) As confidence measure, the cleared portion of the task should be re-investigated to ensure 
that no antipersonnel or small devices have left behind. 
Signed: Chief of Operations UNMACA 
 
Internal Memo 
To: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
From: Chief of Quality Management, UNMACA Kabul 
Date: 17 May 2007 
Subject: Demining Accident Investigation Report [International demining NGO] in Goor Dara 
road of Khuajaohar district of Takhar province. 
With reference to demining incident investigation report of AMAC Kunduz, dated: May 14, 07. 
The investigation report was reviewed and the necessary correction was brought in. 
We support the recommendation of the investigation officer and would like to add the 
following points on it as seems necessary to be reflected in such cases. 
Before commencing/during demining operations all the team leaders are recommended to 
collect more information about the tasks under their operation, in order to make sure that 
there is nothing left from the assessment team and it will help him to update their operation 
plan to meet the requirements. 
In case of this minefield the star basket system should be used for the clearance of remaining 
part of the task and as confidence measure the cleared portion should be reassessed to 
ensure that no YM-I mine or small UXO have been left behind. 
 
From IMSMA report 
Investigation Report of Mine/UXO Accident/Incident within the Ground of Demining. 
Task No. AF-1212-12579 H1475/ HQ — 1585 — SHA – 4: Survey Date - 16/11/06 
Mechanical Team 9 using the “Mechanical Gill System” detonated a mine under a tyre at 
10:45 on April 19, 2007. Operator was using loader for Excavation of Road by Gill System. 
Accident/Incident Location 
History of the Minefield: This task is a road which is diverted from Khwaja Ghar- Talucian 
main road in Ham war say village leading to Goor Darah village. Due to the [International 
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demining NGO] GS team report the length of this road is 1030m contaminated by AT YM-II 
mines were laid by North Alliance during the conflict with Taliban. This task is covered in LIS 
HQ No 1585 SHA No 4. The General survey of this task had been done by [International 
demining NGO] GS team in 16/11/06. A Minefield H/2948 has been cleared in the same SHA 
before commencing this task and an incident had happened with the same MDU on 10/03/07 
in mentioned task (H/2948) which caused damage to the tire of loader. The area of the task is 
10300 sqm and 5770 sqm has already been cleared by MDU-09, one YM-Il AT mine has 
been discovered by the team during the operation up to date. The depth for MDU clearance in 
this task is identified 30 cm from the original surface of the ground. According to our findings 
from the local people during investigation of this incident, it was proved that both side of the 
road have been contaminated by APM laid by same party. Additionally a villager named Nasir 
Ahmad who provided us with information was the victim of mine from the same SHA, but the 
[International demining NGO] team leader didn't have the information regarding AP mines in 
both side of the road. 
[The accident site is shown below.] 
 
Description of the accident/ incident: 
The mentioned incident has happened when the MDU-09 was levelling the loose/ excavated 
soil after the clearance process. The loader was excavating the ground by its bucket then by 
its gill system the soil was inspecting for AT mines and large UXO. During the inspection 
process an AP mine type YM-I was passed through the grids of bucket, and missed to be 
inspected. While the loader was levelling and dragging the loosed soil in reverse position its 
front left side tire stepped on the mine and was exploded. It haven't caused any serious 
damages to the machine only the robber portion of tire got some damages, fortunately didn't 
cause casualty as well. As soon as the accident had happened the team's operation was 
ceased, and the movement of the machine was stopped to avoid further accidents/ incidents 
and to conduct the investigation. The report was relayed to [International demining NGO] 
Operation section and to the AMAC Kunduz by [International demining NGO] Operation 
officer. 
Site conditions: The ground was described as flat and open. The soil was soft and dry. The 
weather was clear and mild. There was no vegetation. 
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 Depth of the mine from the hillside 1m. 
Team Operation outlook: The last refresher course had been in Feb 2007. The Team had 
been at the site since 11/04/3007. They worked from 06:40 to 13:40. The team has two 
breaks, 09:00 – 09:30 and 11:45 – 12:00. The last leave period was 20/03/2007 — 
31/03/2007. 
Conclusion: 
Accident/incident happened due to lack of information about the MF. 
Recommendations  
The [International demining NGO] GS teams are recommended to acquire and collect the 
exact and precise information regarding the task and devices, and report it correctly and 
precisely. 
The MDU-09 team leader is strongly recommended to conduct the reconnaissance of the task 
prior to the commencement of operation and shall keep the contact with local people and up 
date his information, because during the investigation we caught the information regarding the 
task from the locals, as they confirmed the presence of APM in both side of the road. 
Additionally when we checked the task folder documents we found a local demining request 
shows the AP mines in both sides of the road but the deminers didn't have information about 
it. 
The star basket system with MDU should be used for the rest of the task: as the APMs and 
small UXO to be inspected thoroughly which are not able dropping through the grids of this 
system while in the Gill system it has the possibility of dropping due to the wider holes. 
The [International demining NGO] Operation section is required to authorize the team leader 
in the task to make decision about getting information and how to clear the task and shall 
remain initiative. 
Attachments: [Held on file.] 
Note: 
The late cause of the report was that [International demining NGO] had removed their Volvo 5 
machine from the accident site and some changes had come in the accident site so we were 
waited for the site pictures of the accident as the accident had happened on Thursday 19 
April, 2007 and the [International demining NGO] teams were leaving on 21 April so the site 
investigation was done on 21 April but the pictures we received from [International demining 
NGO] on May 01, 2007. 
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 STATEMENTS 
Statement and Witness Report 1: Team Leader 
Date:21/04/07 
Q1: Please explain that when the incident was occurred, during incident where were you and 
what was the cause of the incident. 
On 10: 45 date 19/ 04/ 07 the incident was occurred I was standing and controlling the 
operator by binocular from 300m distance, in my opinion the cause of the incident was the 
miss information of the GS team. 
Q2: As it seems that you have started the work in this task effective 5/ 03/ 07 for 46 days 
during this period don't you acquire complete information regarding the task and types of 
mine from the local residence. Why? 
As you know better that I am a team leader of MDU and I am working based to the GS report 
the gathering and acquiring of information isn't my responsibility. 
Q3: As it is proved that the both side of the road has APM and you showed the area safe and 
were walking in both side of the road weren't it dangerous for you and for your team's 
personal? 
Before the incident happened we believed the area as an ATM and we were functional as gill 
system now that the incident was happened we will change our system of work to Star Basket 
before we marked the both side of the road by white stones and now as you saw we put the 
red and white stones on the sides of the road. 
Q4: To avoid such incidents/ Incident in the future what recommendation/ suggestion do you 
have to be applied? 
As the Afghanistan is a war-ruined country so the different kind of incident/ incident may 
occur, any way the exact and precise information regarding the task has its own worth. 
 
Statement and Witness Report 2: MDU No 9 Operator 
Date:21/ 04/ 07  
Q1: In what Task No were you working when the incident was happened and what did you did 
after incident? 
I was working in Task No H/ 1475; the incident was happened on 10: 45 after the incident I 
stopped the operation based on my team leader order. 
Q2: Did you know about the APM laid down in this task prior to incident? 
No I didn't have information regarding the AMP in the task. 
Q3: Please explain the damages to the MDU through the incident. 
The MDU or Volvo 5 one Tyre has got damages. 
Q4: Please explain the shortage or mistake which lead to incident and who were the 
responsible for this incident. 
In my opinion the only mistake of the GS team was that they did not gather the exact 
information. 
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 Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the investigators 
found that the survey had failed to identify an obvious threat that was already on record as 
being present at the site.  
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the same International 
demining NGO that conducted the survey then deployed an inappropriate machine to work at 
the area. It is only luck that prevented personnel stepping on missed mines. 
The National Authority should have required that the area already sifted with the Gill machine 
be processed again with the smaller grid. However, given that no machine reliably locates all 
small AP mines, another system should have been required (and would have in most 
countries). 
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